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Volume I:  Technical Assessment Report 
1.0 Authorization and Notification  
Ms. Susan L. Creasy, Johnson Space Center (JSC) initiated a request to the NASA Engineering 
and Safety Center (NESC) on January 3, 2006, to conduct a technical assessment for an 
investigation of the ISS External TV Camera Shutdown. 
The Technical Assessment Plan was approved by the NESC Review Board (NRB) on January 5, 
2006.
The assessment was led by Mr. Robert Kichak, NESC Discipline Expert (NDE) at Goddard 
Space Flight Center (GSFC). 
This was initially envisioned to be a short-term assessment and was required by the end of 
January in order to meet flight dates.  However, subsequent schedule changes allowed for later 
input.  Preliminary Findings, Observations, and Recommendations were presented to the NRB 
and the stakeholders in February 2006.  This report documents the completed assessment 
activity. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
The objective of this technical assessment was to investigate the on-orbit shutdown problem with 
the ISS External TV Camera Group (ETVCG) that the ISS Video Subsystem Problem Resolution 
Team (SPRT) concluded to be most likely caused by a Television Camera Interface Converter 
(TVCIC) Modular Devices Inc. (MDI) power supply workmanship problem. 
Failures
The Truss Segment Starboard -1 (S1) ETVCG was installed on 9A (STS-112), and the TVCIC 
failure signature of shut downs up to two times per hour behavior started two years after 
installation.  The second failure was with the Truss Segment Port-1 (P1) ETVCG which was 
launched on 11A (STS-113), but was just installed in November 2005.  Its anomalous failure 
started within one hour of initial start-up.  It had nine shut downs in December 2005.  During 
each shut down the ground operators observed loss of video which was restored by cycling the 
power to the affected TVCIC.  Limited telemetry indicated a drop in power to the TVCIC 
coincident with the loss of video. 
Cause/Solution
According to the fault tree (See Figure 7.6-1), the ISS Video SPRT concluded that the MDI 
power supply is the most probable cause of the shutdowns, and they have recommended 
replacing it with the Century power supply.  Plans are that any time a camera group is brought to 
the ground, unless the launch schedule precludes it, the MDI power supply should be replaced 
with a Century power supply.  Also, any TVCICs on the ground should have the MDI power 
supply replaced with a Century power supply.  Having completed the assessment, the NESC 
recommends the MDI power supplies should be replaced with the Century power supplies.  This 
recommendation is contingent upon satisfactory completion of the recommendations related to 
the Century supplies. 
The ISS has recently flown an additional TVCIC with an MDI power supply, Utilization 
Logistics Flight (ULF) 1.1 (STS-121), and is preparing to fly a TVCIC with a Century power 
supply on 12A.1 (STS-116).  The one on ULF 1.1 supports the Floating Potential Measurement 
Unit (FPMU), and the one on 12A.1 supports a camera group that will be used to replace the 
anomalous S1 camera group. As a risk mitigation effort, Century power supplies were built and 
certified as ground replacements for the MDI power supplies in the event of their failure.
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5.0 Assessment Plan 
5.1 Charter 
The Charter established the ISS External TV Camera Shutdown Investigation within the NESC.  
It defined the mission, responsibilities, membership, and conduct of operations for this Technical 
Assessment.  This assessment was initiated out-of-board by authority of the Director of the 
NESC.  The objective was to perform a technical assessment of the on-orbit shutdown problem 
with the ISS onboard ETVCGs that was thought to be due to a TVCIC MDI power supply 
workmanship problem.  
5.2 Team 
Four NESC team members with relevant expertise was formed to evaluate the ISS External TV 
Camera Shutdown and provide an independent assessment. 
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6.0 Description of the Problem 
6.1 Problem 
The S1 ETVCG was installed on 9A, and the TVCIC failure signature is that it shuts down up to 
two times per hour.  This behavior began after two years of operations.  The second ETVCG that 
failed was the P1 ETVCG which was launched on 11A but was installed in November 2005. The 
shutdown failures began within one hour after initial start-up. It had nine shut downs in 
December 2005 and continues to display intermittent shut downs.  As shown in the fault tree 
(Figure 7.6-1), ISS Video SPRT concluded that the MDI power supply is the most probable 
cause, and they have recommended replacing this with the Century unit.  During each shut down 
the ground operators observed loss of video which was restored by cycling the power to the 
affected TVCIC.  Limited telemetry indicated a drop in power to the TVCIC coincident with the 
loss of video. 
x A camera malfunction can cause loss of video, but if the TVCIC is still functioning it will 
loop back a sync signal.  Each time the camera group video output is lost, no sync signal 
is present, indicating that the TVCIC is not outputting any signal at all.  That coupled 
with very low ETVCG power consumption further indicates that the TVCIC shut itself 
down (power supply shut down) rather than being powered on and simply not passing 
video.
x “Cycling of power” is an intentional interruption of input power to the TVCIC.  If there is 
an interruption of power, there should be a corresponding interruption of output and when 
the power is re-applied, the video output will be restored.  The camera begins functioning 
as soon as power is applied.
x The ISS Video SPRT indicates that there were no pan-tilt commanding events 
corresponding to the camera video loss events or the camera shutdown events. 
x Very early on in the failure history, commands to pan-tilt were sent to the S1 camera 
group in its failed condition, meaning there was no video output from the S1 camera 
group.  The S1 camera group was observed with the lab camera group to see if the S1 
camera group responded to those commands and the S1 camera group did not respond.  
In addition, there was no 35 watt increase in S1 camera group power consumption 
indicating that the pan-tilt did not respond.
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6.2 Plan of Action 
The NESC team needed to rule out problem sources other than the power converters.  A focus of 
the assessment was to verify that the problems were not caused by either the input source or the 
load, namely; a) the remote power controller module (RPCM)/ remote power converter (RPC), 
or b) Camera Assembly consisting of Camera, Pan control, Tilt control, etc.  The NESC team 
reviewed Project provided materials including: 
x Block diagram and description of overall system.  
x Details of any elements (e.g., electromagnetic interference [EMI] filter, switching, etc.) 
electrically ahead of the power supply.
x Background including history of MDI unit problems, rework, and retest.  
x How these known workmanship problems can result in the observed failure signature.  
x Any Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) records of failures on orbit or 
prior to launch.
x JSC generated fault tree and verbal rationale for closure of items closed 
x Circuit diagram of MDI unit, electrical loading, input characteristics, thermal 
environment, etc.  
x Description of available on-orbit telemetry and relevant data for review.  
x Circuit diagram of replacement Century unit. 
x Review of Century power supply documentation and test data 
x CTVC Electrical Input characterization 
The ISS has recently flown an additional TVCIC with an MDI power supply, Utilization 
Logistics Flight (ULF) 1.1 (STS-121), and is preparing to fly a TVCIC with a Century power 
supply on 12A.1 (STS-116).  The one on ULF 1.1 supports the Floating Potential Measurement 
Unit (FPMU), and the one on 12A.1 supports a camera group that will be used to replace the 
anomalous S1 camera group. As a risk mitigation effort, Century power supplies were built and 
certified as ground replacements for the MDI power supplies in the event of their failure.
Input Source Side Considerations 
There was a need to obtain data to verify the RPC outputs always stayed above 115V, even after 
the camera and/or TVCIC shut down. Fortunately, the RPCM has telemetry to indicate the status 
of each of its RPC outputs. 
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7.0 Data Analysis 
This section contains sub-sections that describe the results of the NESC team’s assessment and 
analysis of each of the elements of the scope as described in Section 6.0. 
7.1 Block Diagram and Description of Overall System  
7.1.1 ETVCG and TVCIC Description  
The TVCIC is one of the three major sub-assemblies of the ETVCG as shown in Figure 7.1-1. 
The ETVCG provides video image generation and color television support in the regions of the 
ISS external to the enclosed pressurized volume. The ETVCG, an Orbital Replacement Unit 
(ORU) of the Video Subsystem (VDS), is described in Lockheed Martin Communications (now 
L-3 Communication Systems) Drawing 10033124, “B1 Prime Item Development Specification, 
External.”1 The other two major sub-assemblies of the ETVCG are the Color Television Camera 
(CTVC) and the Pan Tilt Unit (PTU). The TVCIC contains the:
x Fiber optic (FO) transmitter and receiver required to transmit and receive optical Pulse 
Frequency Modulation (PFM) signals. 
x PFM video signal modulator and the PFM sync and control signal demodulator. 
x Built-in status electronics.  
x Pressure transducer. 
x Encoder.
x Multiplexer for insertion of status data and absolute pan tilt position/bit data on line 14 
and the insertion of time tag on line 15. 
x Power conditioning electronics, i.e. MDI or Century power supply.
The power conditioning electronics, located in the TVCIC, provide the 28 VDC power to 
operate the TVCIC, CTVC, and PTU subassemblies, FO pulse frequency modulation PFM 
video signal, sync and control signal ports, and the camera location code port.  It further 
provides the mechanical interfaces required for mounting the PTU and attachment of the 
ETVCG to the ISS truss assembly. The TVCIC also provides an electrical interface between 
the ISS 120V supply and the removable light assembly provided by McDonnell Douglas 
Aerospace (MDA).
1 Boornaard, A., B1 Prime Item Development Specification ETVCG, 2 May 1997 
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Figure 7.1-1.  ETVCG
[ref. Certificate of Product Baseline #222023A, Part Number 10033194-501, S/N 005] 
Figure 7.1-2 illustrates the mechanical arrangement of the TVCIC in the ETVCG and identifies 
the mechanical interfaces for attachment of the PTU, (B), and attachment of the ETVCG to the 
space station truss assembly, (C). Figure 7.1-3 identifies the external interfaces for FO PFM sync 
and control and FO PFM video signals, electrical power, and the camera location identification. 
Figure 7.1-3 also identifies the internal interfaces between the TVCIC and CTVC and between 
the TVCIC and the PTU.  Additional interface information is shown in Figure 7.1-4, and the 
ETVCG interconnection is shown in the diagram in Figure 7.1-5.  The Type IV power supply is 
shown within the TVCIC in Figures 7.1-3 through 7.1-5.  Separate “A” and “B” power feeds are 
Color TV Camera
Integrated
Light Assembly
TV Camera
Interface
Converter
Filter Box
Assembly
Pan and
Tilt Unit
Lens shield on 
spacer assembly
Tether Lug
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provided with the “A” powering the TVCIC electronics, CTVC, and PTU and the “B” powering 
the heaters. 
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Figure 7.1-2.  External TV Camera Group Sub-Assemblies 
[ref. Boornaard, A., “TVCIC Development Specification 10033125 Revision D”, dated 20 
February 1997]
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Figure 7.1-3.  TVCIC Electrical Interfaces 
[ref. Boornaard, A., “TVCIC Development Specification 10033125 Revision D”, dated 20 
February 1997] 
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Figure 7.1-4.  Additional Interface Information 
[ref. Certificate of Product Baseline #222023A, Part Number 10033194-501, S/N 005]
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Figure 7.1-5.  ETVCG Interconnection Diagram 
[ref. Certificate of Product Baseline #222023A, Part Number 10033194-501, S/N 005]
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7.1.2 Block Diagram and Description of the Type IV Power Supply  
A block diagram of the Type IV power supply as manufactured by MDI is shown in Figure 7.1-
6.  This unit is defined by General Electric Aerospace (now L-3 Communications) Source 
Control Document (SCD) 10036714 Revision L. 
Figure 7.1-6. Type IV (MDI) Power Supply Block Diagram 
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The power supply design employs six forward power converter channels, as shown in Figure 7.1-
6, with the “B” channel for heater power separated from all other channels with a separate 120 
volt input and EMI filter.  The “A” outputs provide power to the TVCIC electronics (the “A1” 
outputs of +5.1 volts, +/-15 volts, and -5.25 volts), the “A2” +28 volt output supplies the camera, 
and the A3 +28 volt output to the Pan/Tilt assembly. 
To overcome a camera turn-on issue (due to inrush peak current demand by the camera during 
turn-on), the power supply was modified to insert a 0.5 ohm resistor in series with the “A2” 
output and cross-tie the “A3” output through a series 1.0 ohm resistor as shown.  The design also 
incorporates protection features described below and also shown in Figure 7.1-6: 
• An undervoltage sense circuit (set at approximately 71.9 volts) sensed at the output of the 
EMI filter for either the “A” or the “B” section will inhibit switching of that section (all 
“A” or “B” outputs).
• An overvoltage on any “A1” output will shut down all “A” outputs and latch off until 
input power is cycled. 
• An overvoltage on the “A2” output will shut down “A2” and latch off until input power is 
cycled.
• An overvoltage on the “A3” output will shut down “A3” and latch off until input power is 
cycled.
• An overvoltage on the “B” output will shut down the “B” output and latch off until input 
power is cycled.
• An overcurrent (~2.9 Amps) on the “A2” output will cause that output to limit its output 
current. 
7.2   Details of Relevant Elements (e.g., EMI Filter, Switching, etc.) 
Electrically Ahead of the Power Supply 
7.2.1 Station Power Input to TVCIC 
The MDI Type IV power supply accepts as a nominal input 120V DC. This power is provided 
via two RPCMs (Type V). One RPCM powers the Electronic Power Converter (EPC) #1 input to 
the TVCIC and the Light. The other RPCM powers EPC #2 input to the TVCIC and the Heater. 
Each of these RPCMs is powered from a different dc-to-dc converter unit (DDCU). The EPC #1 
and Light power both come from the same RPCM, but they are fed from separate switches. 
Redundancy is built into the system by breaking up the power supplied to the TVCIC into the 
“A” and “B” side RPCMs fed by “A” and “B” side DDCUs. The RPCMs are allowed to feed 
other RPCMs to allow for load shedding or re-routing of power. The two harness lengths that 
were provided by the Boeing Electrical Power System (EPS) engineers were approximately 241 
feet and 255 feet for the S1 Lower Outboard (LOOB) ETVCG and the P1 LOOB ETVCG 
respectively.  The NESC team considered the possibility that the voltage to the TVCIC from the 
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RPCM was out of range.  Since there is no direct monitoring of the current drawn by the TVCIC, 
this quantity can only be derived. The current telemetry that is available is the total current into 
the RPCM. Comparing the total current into the RPCM before and after the video loss (or 
TVCIC shutdown), it was found that the difference in total current level is consistent with the 
known current draw for the TVCIC.
7.2.2 RPCM Description 
Each RPCM powering the TVCIC has the capability of 16 separate 3.5A output switches and 
two separate 12A switches. The RPCM is a current limiting type. This type of RPCM will 
current-limit at a current of 115 + five percent. The RPCM will open when a current limit occurs 
for 32 to 40 milliseconds.  Also, for input undervoltage of less than 105V for 50 milliseconds, all 
RPCs open.  Input voltage recovery to greater than 111.5V for 50 milliseconds after 
undervoltage trip will re-close open RPCs.  Automatic recovery after a second undervoltage trip 
is nominally disabled and further recovery requires manual intervention.  The RPCM provides 
power to several different loads in addition to the TVCIC unit.  This power goes to units that 
may or may not be related to the TVCIC operation. The document titled “User Electric Power 
Specifications and Standards Volume 1: 120 Volt DC Loads”2 describes the power quality that is 
guaranteed.  Any effects, however small, with one load on an RPCM affecting another load on 
the same RPCM (but different switches), can be found in this document. 
7.2.3 RPCM Telemetry 
Much of the troubleshooting of the camera failure focuses on what types of clues were given by 
the telemetry prior to a failure.  The level of telemetry provided by the system is somewhat 
limited.  Each RPC switch of an RPCM provides two bits of status that represent three states: 
CLOSED, OPEN, and INVALID.  When the voltage out of an individual RPC switch is greater 
than 111.5V the RPCM reports that this switch is “closed”.  When a voltage out of an RPC is 
less than 10.0V, the RPCM reports that this switch is “open”.  When the voltage is in between, it 
is reported as “invalid”.  Switch states are reported nominally every 10 seconds (the process can 
be sped up to 1 Hz. rate in data dump mode).  These data rates could mask a transient event that 
causes a response in the TVCIC, but the ISS EPS has no history of this kind of transient 
behavior. If a transient event were to occur, at the conclusion of the event, the TVCIC would 
most likely be powered on and functioning since the transient would have the same effect as a 
power cycle.  The only input current telemetry reported would be a composite current telemetry 
for all of the current into the RPCM.  This composite current includes all current outputs from all 
16 switches/loads and RPCM housekeeping current (to bias up internal operation).  This RPCM 
input current is actively sampled every millisecond, but this data is integrated and reported 
2 http://iss-www.jsc.nasa.gov/ss/issapt/eps/SSP52051Oct05.pdf
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nominally every 10 seconds. However, it can be collected every second to permit a segregated 
analysis of each RPC switch.  The data is transmitted to the ground where these 0.1Hz samples 
are processed to create a rather slow derivative function.  There is no telemetry to alert someone 
that a RPC switch has experienced a current limit event.   
7.2.4 TVCIC Power Input 
The MDI Type IV power supply unit has two separate EMI input filters. These filters are built up 
as a separate assembly and incorporated internal to the Type IV unit. 
Figure 7.2-1 illustrates the electrical circuit of the EMI filters internal to the Type IV unit. Note: 
This schematic was redrawn from schematic information that was fax’ed from MDI (as such 
there may be some errors in interpretation). 
Figure 7.2-1.  Simplified Schematics of EMI Input Filters 
(Based on data provided by MDI) 
[ref. Schematic Diagram Power Supply, GE Type IV, MDI Drawing 2696-02] 
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7.3 Background Including History of MDI Unit, Problems, Rework, and 
Retest
A description of MDI power supply workmanship problems and L-3 Communications’ rework of 
these follows in Table 7.3-1 and 7.3-2. 
Table 7.3-1. Root Cause/Corrective Action Summary 
[ref. Heydman, William, “CR: AOE-0473 C&T, Type III and Type IV Power Supply 
Rework”, dated 8 November 1999] 
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Table 7.3-2.  MDI Power Supply Rework Matrix 
[ref. Heydman, William, “CR: AOE-0473 C&T, Type III and Type IV Power Supply 
Rework”, dated 8 November 1999] 
A description of the MDI power supply workmanship problems, which were reworked by L-3 
Communications, are described below: 
The NESC team has not evaluated the documentation for each specific power supply (from 
locations S1, P1). The NESC team’s understanding is that the units were completely 
disassembled and repairs were performed on all of the Type IV units. These repairs were done 
preemptively and were identical from one unit to the next. The NESC team did not feel it was an 
efficient use of resources to review all of the travelers. The NESC team examined the possibility 
that some units did not receive the same repair operations unintentionally.  Please refer to Robert 
Cookes comments on rework in Appendix D. There were poor solder joints on many of the 
harness wires.  The problem was compounded by the fact that most wires in the design were 
connected to the circuit card assembly (CCA) using a turret terminal.  The terminals were not in 
plated through-holes which left the design to rely on electrical connection at the small annular 
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ring/pad at the top and far side of the board.  On many of the connections, the terminal was used 
as the connection from a top-side circuit trace to a back-side trace.  This means if either the top 
or far side solder joint cracked, it could result in an intermittent connection.  There are over 100 
solder terminals in each MDI power supply.  L-3 Communications ended up doing a full 
replacement of each wire in the harness and soldered a bus wire “leash” from each terminal to a 
lap solder joint on each related trace. 
Additionally, there were similar issues with some of the potted transformers used in the units. L-
3 Communications had to carefully excavate the potting compound, and make similar upgrades 
to the terminals on the transformer boards/terminals, and then re-pot the transformers.  The 
difficulties associated with this scope of repair and modification are described in Appendix D. 
As was discussed at the December 13, 2005, Technical Interface Meeting (TIM), L-3 
Communications also added some “load sharing” to the MDI design to accommodate the higher 
than expected in-rush current experienced on one of the outputs in the design.
7.4 How These Known Workmanship Problems Can Result in the 
Observed Failure Signature 
Summary of MDI Power Supply Assessment 
The MDI power supply deliveries were completed in December 1994, (14 flight units). Before 
these power supplies were flown in orbit, failures were discovered in August 1997. L-3 
Communications Systems, and their subcontractor MDI, started reworking failed units in late 
1997 and early 1998. After being installed on-board the ISS, these units exhibited failures as 
listed below:  
Signature of in-flight failures (per NESC/TAC #PL-06-04): 
x TVCIC from S1 ETVCG shuts down two times per hour. 
x TVCIC from P1 ETVCG (installed 11/05) shut down nine times in one month. 
Suspected cause/reason for failures (as expressed in NESC/TAC #PL-06-04): 
The packaging design and workmanship in the MDI power supply assembly is suspected of 
contributing to the cause/reason for the in-flight failures. While there may be other suspected 
causes/reasons for the MDI power supply failures under investigation, such as parts degradation 
due to radiation exposure or the electrical design, this report section addresses only packaging 
and workmanship related failures.    
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Brief summary description of documented workmanship problems suspected of 
contributing to the MDI power supply failures (per Will Heydon’s CR: AOE-0473, dated 
November 8, 1999): 
1. Broken capacitor leads due to mechanical stress. 
2. Failed Field Effect Transmitter (FET) bond wires within hybrid due to electrical 
overstress (fused open).  Since MDI power supplies are utilized in other applications 
onboard the ISS, the NESC team requested information regarding how the bond wires 
were fixed in the MDI hybrids (e.g., thicker wires added with solder, braze, weld, 
conductive epoxy, etc.).  This information was not available at the time of this report.  
Some repair techniques may be less reliable and prone to failure.   
3. Fractured solder joints on swaged terminals due to poor printed wiring board (PWB) 
design/layout. Swaged terminals installed in un-plated through holes, insufficient solder, 
and dissimilar materials. 
4. Fractured solder joints on transformer pins due to poor PWB design/layout, installation in 
un-plated through holes, poor solder wetting, and dissimilar materials. 
5. Missing failure reports, undocumented rework, missing and incomplete travelers, missing 
test data, and missing in-process inspections. 
6. Wiring errors discovered in Type IV supplies. 
7. Blown rack fuse occurred during thermal testing (+/- 5V). 
8. Blown rack fuse occurred during OVP testing. 
9. Two “swaged terminal life tests” failed October 29, 1998.  
10. Rework of transformer caused cracks in 2oz. and 4oz. copper traces. Leash repair of all 
pins and terminals completed (see Figures 7.4-1 & 7.4-2).  
11. Extensive rework performed to correct these problems (at least 2,530 repairs, added 
wires, reworks, and touch-ups). 
NASA Engineering and Safety  
Center Report
Document #: 
RP-06-49
Version: 
1.0
Title:
International Space Station (ISS) External Television (TV) 
Camera Shutdown Investigation 
Page #: 
30 of 106 
NESC Request No. 06-001-E 
Figure 7.4-1.  Picture of Reworked Power Supply showing Leash/Jumper Wires 
[ref. Heydman, William, “AOE 0473, TRC Power Supply Card Out of Spec”, Current ECD 
dated 22 September 1999] 
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Figure 7.4-2.  Power Supply Types of Terminals – Pins & Repairs 
[ref. Heydman, Will, “CR: AOE-0473 C&T, Type III and Type IV Power Supply Rework”, 
dated 8 November 1999] 
7.4.1 Workmanship Problems Can Result in the Observed Power Supply Shut-Down – 
Possible Causes 
As shown on the SCD of MDI Type-IV power supply, the overvoltage protection is implemented 
as follows: 
1. An overvoltage condition on any of the “A1” outputs will latch all of the “A” outputs off. 
The outputs shall be reset by removing and reapplying the 120 VDC input voltage. 
2. An overvoltage condition on the “A2” output will latch the “A2” output off. The “A2” 
output shall be reset by removing and reapplying the 120 VDC input voltage. 
3. An overvoltage condition on the “A3” output will latch the “A3” output off. The “A3” 
output shall be reset by removing and reapplying the 120 VDC input voltage. 
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4. An overvoltage condition on the “B” output will latch the “B” output off. The “A” 
outputs will not be affected. The “B” output shall be reset by removing and reapplying 
the 120 VDC input voltage. 
The observed failure is that the ETVCG turned off by itself. This is interpreted from the absence 
of any video output from the camera while the RPCM input to the unit was normal.  The absence 
of video can occur if one of the “A1” outputs attains an overvoltage condition.  There is no 
telemetry available to exactly pin-point which one of the three outputs triggered an overvoltage 
shutdown.
The overvoltage condition could occur due to one or more of the following: 
1. An intermittent connection in the feedback loop, a broken wire, dry solder joint, etc. 
related to workmanship problems can result in intermittent connections possibly induced 
by thermal excursions or relatively higher operating temperatures. These problems 
escaped and were not caught by the conventional acceptance tests. Experience shows, for 
example, that cracks in ceramic chip capacitors can propagate over approximately six 
months and then can show symptoms of their behavior in degraded performance. 
2. An intermittent connection in the control loop resulting in an unstable loop driving the 
output voltage to the limits of overvoltage. 
3. Transients reflected from the load side on to the TVCIC, possibly due to intermittent 
connections or degraded camera performance. 
4. Broken wires and/or intermittent connections in the overvoltage detection circuitry result 
in apparent (false) overvoltage.
5. The intermittent shorting of primary windings of the TVCIC transformers such that the 
control loop was not able to respond quickly enough to prevent overvoltages. 
6. There may be a number of other possibilities, presently not analyzed, that can occur due 
to intermittent connections.  
7.5 Any PRACA Records of Failures on Orbit or Prior to Launch
The following is a list of PRACA problem reports (PRs) that were entered into NASA’s PRACA 
PR database concerning the failures of MDI power supplies.  The PRACA PR number is given, 
followed by the PR title, the ORU the PR was written against, and the date that either the 
problem was noticed or the date the PRACA PR was opened.  During integration and test a 
number of previously unexplained shutdowns had been experienced. These failures led the 
development team to initiate an inspection of all of the MDI power supplies. 
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The following seven PRACA PRs were opened during ground testing: 
550 - Power supply values not to spec - TVCIC - 06/17/1998 
The "test connector" program showed that the Status Telemetry Module (STM) had problems 
locking up to the incoming video, so this problem was not with the flight hardware and thus was 
not reportable. 
552 - Type IV Power Supply failure - TVCIC - 06/17/1998 
An ETVCG shut down during a pre-integration test at the vendor.  Troubleshooting isolated the 
failure to the MDI power supply.  The power supply was replaced and subsequent testing was 
nominal. 
731 - External Video Switch Type III Power Supply unexpectedly shut down - VSW - 
08/07/1998
During a vibration test VSW shut down.  Troubleshooting determined there were fractured solder 
terminals in the MDI power supply as well as test software problems. 
771 - External Video Switch Type III Power Supply unexpectedly shut down - VSW - 
08/20/1998
During a signal to crosstalk test the VSW shut down.  Troubleshooting determined there were 
fractured solder terminals in the MDI power supply as well as test software problems. 
1909 - Fractured Solder Joints On Swaged Terminals and Transformer Terminals - TVCIC - 
05/15/1998, AOE 
The investigation found that the following factors contributed to the failures of the ETVCG 
during testing:  Fractured solder joints on swaged terminals, fractured solder joints on 
transformer terminals, failed FET bond wires. 
3269 - FPMU/TVCIC failed to activate when power was applied - TVCIC - 01/14/2003 - PQ 
During power quality testing of the FPMU/TVCIC assembly the assembly failed to power up 
during one of the power cycles.  The assembly was found to fail to power up about 1 time out of 
10 attempts. 
3270 - FPMU/TVCIC failed to activate when power was applied - TVCIC - 01/14/2003 - EMI 
During EMI testing of the FPMU/TVCIC assembly the assembly failed to power up during one 
of the power cycles.  The assembly was found to fail to power up about 1 time out of 10 
attempts. 
The following two PRACA PRs were opened during on-orbit operations. 
3365 - No video from S1 ETVCG - TVCIC - 05/28/2003 
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The S1 ETVCG operated nominally for a couple of years after installation and then failed off for 
no externally apparent reason.  Subsequent power cycle recovered the function of the hardware.
This failure has been recurring for years. 
Voltage 3875 - Loss of activity on P1 Lower Outboard (LOOB) Camera - TVCIC - 12/01/2005 
The P1 ETVCG operated nominally for an hour after installation and then failed off for no 
externally apparent reason.  Subsequent power cycle recovered the function of the hardware.
This failure has been recurring for months. 
For the complete PRACA Reports, see Appendix E. 
7.6 Fault Tree  
7.6.1 Observed Fault 
The absence of video is the observed fault which results when one of the following occurs: 
1. CTVC is switched off by commanding.
2. Input power to CTVC, namely the “A2” output voltage from TVCIC, is either removed 
or failed. 
3. Failure of the CTVC to output video. 
4. Failure of the Fiber-optic Interface Module (FIM) within the TVCIC to pass video or 
properly sync the video. 
Failure of the CTVC to output video will result in the TVCIC looping back the video signal input 
at the sync and control interface.  This will cause video to appear to be lost at output devices 
(monitors), but video signal indicators in the signal path will show "signal present" indicators.
The lack of the presence of the loopback signal indicates a loss of the nominal functions in the 
TVCIC.
Failure of the FIM would not explain the coincident reduction in power consumption that was 
noted in the telemetry and would require a failure mechanism which would be restored by 
cycling power.  Such a FIM failure mechanism is not known to exist. 
From the above discussion, because only the “A2” output voltage from the TVCIC powers the 
CTVC, the observed failure could perhaps be due to the absence of the “A2” output.  However, 
the absence of a test pattern indicates that more than the “A2” is shut down.  An overvoltage of 
any one of the “A1” outputs also shuts down all the “A” outputs. Thus, the failure appears to 
have started when one of the “A1” outputs experienced an overvoltage limit. The shut down of 
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“A2” or “A” group supplies is consistent with the coincident reduction in power consumption 
noted in the telemetry. 
7.6.2 Failure of “A2” Output or All “A” Outputs 
There are a number of possibilities as to how the “A2” output or all “A” outputs can fail as 
illustrated by the Fault Tree diagram (see Figures 7.6-1). Some of the salient items are listed 
below:
1. Absence of input power. 
2. Load induced failure of “A2” output or all “A” outputs. 
3. Power supply failure. 
a. “A2” only output failure. 
b. One of “A1” outputs failed causing shut down of all “A” outputs.
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7.6.3 Absence of Input Power 
The power supply input is provided via one of the RPCM Type V switches. The NESC team 
obtained the telemetry output of the RPC #15 which provides the input power to the subject 
power supply.  The telemetry did not indicate any intermittency of input power to the power 
converter that supplies the ETVCG camera and PTU. 
The NESC team requested similar RPC telemetry data, regarding the power converter that 
provides power to heaters, to ascertain if the heater or its operation could have any interaction 
with the operation of the camera or PTU.  The temperature never dipped below that required to 
cause the heaters to turn on.  Furthermore, no data indicated that the heaters had inadvertently 
turned on.  Finally, the heater circuit is isolated from the PTU and CTVC power circuits within 
the power supply.  For these reasons, the ISS VDS engineers concluded that heater operation is 
believed to be unrelated to the shutdowns.
7.6.4 Load Induced Failure of “A2” Output or All “A” Outputs 
Unique tests conducted to electrically characterize the input of the TV camera revealed the 
following:
1. Inrush currents spiking/peaking to about 3.1 amps lasting for about 4 milliseconds. 
2. Voltage spikes on the bus were about 1.1 volts above the input voltage. 
The original design of the MDI power supply could not supply the above specified inrush 
current. The assessment team learned that L-3 Communications devised a solution to meet the 
inrush current demand by implementing a resistor cross-tie of the A2 and A3 outputs to supply 
the A2 inrush demand by supplying current from the A3 output. 
The voltage spikes observed in these tests were not of enough amplitude to trigger the 
overvoltage shut down. 
The NESC team also asked the ISS VDS engineers if the PTU was electrically characterized to 
positively verify whether it demands large inrush currents similar to the camera and perhaps 
reflects back large voltage spikes on to “A3” output which gets coupled to “A2” through the 
inrush network.  However, this information was not readily available.  The ISS VDS engineers 
stated that they do not believe the PTU has large inrush current transients similar to the camera 
since the PTU when powered on merely powers an electronic control circuit as opposed to 
motors.  This electronic circuit would not require a large amount of current given the nature of its 
function/design.  The PTU motors were not being commanded when the shutdowns occurred.
And the shut downs initially occurred during steady-state operations without commands being 
sent to the PTU motors or more accurately with no pan or tilt operations occurring.  These are all 
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relevant points that led the VDS engineers to believe investigation down this path was 
unwarranted.
Although a) the packaging of the MDI Power Supply is the probable cause leading to 
intermittent problems and b) the cross-tie of A2 and A3 outputs of MDI Power Supply leading to 
overloading, are possible causes for the TV Camera shut-down, it can not be completely ruled 
out that the c) TV Camera itself may not be the cause. 
7.6.5 Power Supply Failure
Failure of the power supply can occur because of various factors including the following: 
x Workmanship problems, as illustrated in Section 7.4 above. 
x Design deficiency or low margin. 
7.6.5.1  Design Deficiency – Original Design 
The TVCIC power supply designed by MDI utilizes six different instantiations of a power 
hybrid, also designed by MDI. The schematics that were provided to the investigation team to 
review were of poor quality (facsimile documents with handwritten comments that were 
subsequently scanned at low resolution). In a number of cases, pin numbers, values, and part 
numbers were completely indiscernible from the information provided.  
The main functions/components contained in the MDI designed hybrid include a UC1845 Pulse 
width Modulator (PWM), IRFC340 MOSFET die, optocoupler isolated feedback, overvoltage 
protection, and shutdown/inhibit functions with latch/no-latch options. The hybrid design was 
modified from a heritage hybrid design that was originally developed for a different application 
with a much lower input voltage.  
The use of optocouplers in the feedback control loops and in the overvoltage protection circuits 
prompted concerns regarding possible radiation effects such as single event transients and total 
dose current transfer ratio degradation.  However, for the ISS orbit and on-orbit duration, this is 
not a large concern. 
Discussions with the ISS VDS engineers revealed the TVCIC power supply had difficulties 
during restarting attempts.  The hybrid startup circuitry was briefly analyzed. The analysis of this 
design is located in Appendix B of this report. The basic finding from this analysis was that this 
part of the hybrid circuit shows problems in worst-case analysis, and it may possibly be a cause 
of the restart problems with the MDI design. 
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7.6.5.2  Design Modification for Camera Inrush Current 
To overcome the camera turn-on inrush peak current demand, a network was added to 
supplement the capability of the “A2” output by cross-strapping a portion of the “A3” output.
Namely, now the camera is powered by both “A2” output and “A3” output simultaneously.  
However, the “A2” output supplies 2/3 of the camera demand while the “A3” output supplies the 
remaining 1/3 of the camera demand. This is accomplished by inserting a 0.5 ohm resistor in 
series with the “A2” output and cross-tying the “A3” output through a series 1.0 ohm resistor as 
shown (see Figure 7.1-6).
7.6.5.3  Effect of Design Modification on Steady-State Operation
The net effect of inserting the inrush network is the “A2” output is lightly loaded, and steady-
state consumption was reduced to about 42 percent of its original value.  The steady-state power 
consumption on the “A3” output is approximately 106 percent of its rated capability (see the 
Table 7.6-1). 
Table 7.6-1.  Effect of Inrush Network on overall MDI Power System 
 Before inserting 
inrush network 
After inserting 
inrush network 
Before inserting 
inrush network After inserting inrush network 
ETVCG 
Components Power provided by 
Output 
rating
Output 
consumption 
Output 
consumption 
loading 
compared 
to rating 
          
Camera A2 
A2 & A3 1.43A/
40W 0.90A/25.2W 0.60A/16.8W 42% 
          
PTU A3 A3 1.5A/42W 1.29A/36W 1.59A/44.4W 106% 
The above analysis indicates the “A3” circuit while PTU is being operated will be at 106 percent 
of its specification rating.
7.6.5.4  Effect of Design Modification During Turn-On  
The insertion of the inrush network has a greater effect during camera turn-on when the camera
demands a peak inrush current of about 3.1 amps for about 4 milliseconds duration.  As the “A2” 
output can supply only 2/3 of 3.1 amps or 2.07 amps, the remainder of the inrush current of 
about 1.03 amps plus the inrush current (unknown) of the PTU must be supplied by the “A3” 
module.  Further analysis could not be conducted due to non availability of PTU input 
characterization data. 
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7.6.5.5  Impact on PTU Operation 
The NESC team was informed that at times the S1 PTU fails to tilt down.  During these events,
it will tilt up and it will pan left or right, but will not tilt down.  The P1 PTU also experiences tilt 
failures at times, but no panning issues.  Tilting does not require more current draw than 
panning, it appears these PTU anomalies are not related to the power supply shut downs because 
panning and tilting up functions would be similarly affected.  
7.6.5.6  Possible Effect of A3 Failure of “A3” on “A2” and Vice Versa 
Because of the inrush current network, as soon as one of the “A2” or “A3” power stages shuts 
down (for whatever reason), the closed loop control compensation of the other working unit is 
affected.  It is possible that the working unit might become unstable and also shut down. 
7.6.5.7  Possible Effect on Current Mode Control of TVCIC 
The NESC team does not have a top level drawing of where the outputs are sensed after adding 
the “load balancing” resistors. Lacking this detail, the team assumed that sensing of these 
voltages (for feedback and overvoltage) is most likely before the resistors. This “sharing” of the 
inrush current could make for the possibility of interactive effects with the current signals that 
are fed into the current mode control. 
7.6.5.8  Summary 
From the foregoing analysis and discussion, the ETVCG shutdowns can be narrowed down to 
the following possible causes: 
x Physical design and workmanship on the MDI converters.
x Marginal worst-case power converter design. 
7.7 Circuit Diagram of MDI Unit, Electrical Loading, Input Characteristics, Thermal 
Environment
7.7.1 Input Power Limitations 
The SCD that was in effect when the MDI unit was procured states the following information 
regarding limitations on the input power to the unit under five separate conditions. The “A” and 
“B” inputs are fed from separate RPCM switches. From SCD 10036714: 
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INPUT POWER THE POWER SUPPLY SHALL NOT EXCEED THE MAXIMUM STEADY 
STATE INPUT POWERS LISTED BELOW FOR THE VARIOUS OPERATING 
CONDITIONS.
DC TO DC CONVERTER “A” 
1. NORMAL OPERATION         157 WATTS MAXIMUM  
2. NO LOAD (ALL OUTPUTS)        21 WATTS MAXIMUM 
3.  “A2" AND "A3 OUTPUTS INHIBITED           50 WATTS MAXIMUM 
 DC TO DC CONVERTER “B”  
4. NORMAL OPERATION          72 WATTS MAXIMUM  
5. NO LOAD           10 WATTS MAXIMUM 
7.7.2 Overvoltage Protection and Latching 
The SCD that was in effect when the MDI unit was procured states the following information 
regarding the overvoltage protection and latching: 
OVER VOLTAGE PROTECTION (OVP) 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10032543, EXCEPT FOR THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS; 
A. AN OVER VOLTAGE CONDITION ON ANY OF THE “Al” OUTPUTS WILL LATCH 
ALL OF THE “A” OUTPUTS OFF. THE OUTPUTS SHALL BE RESET BY REMOVING 
AND REAPPLYING THE 120 VDC INPUT VOLTAGE.
B. AN OVER VOLTAGE CONDITION ON THE “A2” OUTPUT WILL LATCH THE “A2” 
OUTPUT OFF. THE “A2” OUTPUT SHALL BE RESET BY REMOVING AND 
REAPPLYING THE 120 VDC INPUT VOLTAGE.  
C. AN OVER VOLTAGE CONDITION ON THE “A3” OUTPUT WILL LATCH THE “A3” 
OUTPUT 0FF.THE “A3” OUTPUT SHALL BE RESET BY REMOVING AND 
REAPPLYING THE 120 VDC INPUT VOLTAGE.  
D. AN OVER VOLTAGE CONDITION ON THE “B” OUTPUT WILL LATCH THE “B” 
OUTPUT OFF. THE “A” OUTPUTS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED. THE “B” OUTPUT SHALL 
BE RESET BY REMOVING AND REAPPLYING THE 120 VDC INPUT VOLTAGE. 
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7.7.3 Reliability at 85°C 
The SCD that was in effect when the MDI unit was procured states the following information 
regarding reliability: 
RELIABILITY THE POWER SUPPLY SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM MTBF OF 1,000,000 
HOURS WHEN OPERATED AT A WORST CASE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE OF +85"C. 
THE FAILURE RATE SHALL BE PREDICTED IN ACCORDANCE WlTH MIL-STD-756 
AND MIL-HDBK-217. 
7.7.4 Output Characteristics 
The SCD that was in effect when the MDI unit was procured includes the following table 
summarizing the output characteristics of the power supplies: 
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Table 7.7-1.  Output Characteristics 
[ref. Source Control Drawing, Power Supply, Type IV, GE Aerospace Drawing 10036714] 
7.7.5 Verification Matrix 
The SCD that was in effect when the MDI unit was procured includes the following table 
summarizing the verification method of the Type IV power supply: (It is noted that Overload/Short-
Circuit & Overvoltage Protection Tests are called out as “DEMONSTRATE (OPTIONAL.”) 
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Table 7.7-2.  Verification Matrix 
[ref. Source Control Drawing, Power Supply, Type IV, GE Aerospace Drawing 10036714]
7.7.6 Verification Functional Block Diagram 
The SCD that was in effect when the MDI unit was procured includes diagrammatic information 
of the Type IV power supply summarized in Figure 7.7-1. 
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Figure 7.7-1.  Functional Block Diagram - Type IV Supply 
[ref. Source Control Drawing, Power Supply, Type IV, GE Aerospace Drawing 10036714]
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7.8 Century Power Supply  
7.8.1 Comparison of Design and Workmanship of Century and MDI Supplies 
The MDI power converter design was in large part based on pre-existing MDI technology that 
was pieced together at the system level. The schematics that were provided to the NESC team 
show clear signs of this style of development. For example, the schematics show modular power 
section “blocks” of circuitry where, on one schematic sheet, reference designators are used three 
different times (one for each block).  
The modular design concept is sometimes typical of commercially designed hardware, but it can 
lead to real problems when trying to ensure that assemblies are populated with the proper 
components (with three ‘R3’ resistors at the same mechanical level, this could prove difficult). 
This modular approach also creates invisible restrictions to the designer when a different 
component value is necessary to meet the requirements of a particular stage. The designer is 
either putting a component into the design that does not exactly match the intended mechanical 
footprint, or is forced to compromise the electrical design after succumbing to the project 
pressures of making the mechanical assembly look “neat.”  
The MDI PWB was poorly designed (e.g., turret terminals were used as interfacial connections 
without plated through holes). There is evidence that mechanical stresses were not considered 
carefully, since cracked solder joints were found. The MDI Type IV power supply assemblies 
had an average of 100 repairs per board (typically no more than 12 per board are allowed). Most 
of these repairs were to install “leashing” to ensure a proper electrical connection to the board. 
For details of the MDI workmanship evaluation, see Appendix C.  Despite these issues, the Mean 
Time Before Failure (MTBF) for the ETVCG per specification is 7,500 hours.  The observed 
failures have demonstrated an approximate MTBF of 10,400 hours based on five failures (USLab 
Group return address, tilt non-response, tilt telemetry problem, green channel loss, and power 
loss) in approximately 52,000 operating hours. 
Detailed design and packaging documentation of even the smallest assemblies for Century Power 
Supply was provided.  Review of it convinced the NESC team that the mechanical assembly of 
the power supply was relatively robust to withstand vibration loads. The Century design did not 
employ any hybrid components and was clearly documented. Review of the photographs of the 
Century power supply mechanical assemblies assure that the Century Power Supply is less likely 
to encounter workmanship problems similar to the MDI Power Supply. 
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7.8.2 Enhanced Output Ratings/Capability of Century Power Supply 
To overcome the workmanship problems and design deficiencies associated with MDI TVCIC 
power supply, the Century power supply was developed and is being assessed here for its 
adequacy to meet the performance requirements.  
The output characteristics of MDI power supply is provided in Table 7.8-1, whereas the Table 
7.8-2 presents the output characteristics for the Century power supply. The salient points are 
compared in Table 7.8-3 to emphasize the superior characteristics of the Century power supply.    
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report
Document #: 
RP-06-49
Version: 
1.0
Title:
International Space Station (ISS) External Television 
(TV) Camera Shutdown Investigation 
Page #: 
48 of 106
NESC Request No. 06-001-E 
Table 7.8-1.  MDI Power Supply Output Characteristics 
[ref. Source Control Drawing, Power Supply, Type IV, GE Aerospace Drawing 10036714]
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Table 7.8-2.  Century Power Supply Output Characteristics 
[ref. Source Control Drawing, Power Supply, Type IV, L3 Communications Drawing 
K10048295, Revision E]
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Table 7.8-3.  Power Requirements and Comparison of Output Characteristics of MDI and 
Century Power Supplies 
ETVCG 
Component 
Power 
sourced 
by  
Actual Power requirement 
(Amps/Watts) 
MDI Power Supply 
Capability 
(Amps/Watts) 
Century Power 
Supply Capability 
(Amps/Watts) 
Camera
A2 of 
TVCIC Steadystate =  0.90A/25.2W (Measured)  Steadystate = 2A/56W Steadystate = 3A/84W 
    Peak = 3.1A/87W for 4 msec (Test) Peak = 2.9 A/81 W 
Peak = 4A/112 W for 
500m sec 
          
Pan-Tilt Unit
(PTU)
A3 of 
TVCIC Steadystate =   0.09A/2.5W (Specification) Steadystate = 1.5A/42W Steadystate = 3A/84W 
    Peak =  1.30A/36W (Specification) Peak = 1.5A/42W Peak = 3A/84W 
The overvoltage trip limits are the same for both power supplies, and the “A2” output capacitor 
has been increased to 100 ȝF (Century) compared to a value of 30 ȝF for the MDI power supply. 
Referring to Century ATP data, the NESC team also asked if oscilloscope pictures taken of the 
power supply output voltages under no load condition. The tabular data provided gives the 
voltage readings taken using a meter which may not record the peak voltages. However, pictures 
were not available at the time of this report. 
EMI Enclosures employed in Century power supplies are tin plated. This may pose a tin whisker 
growth concern.
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8.0 Findings, Observations, and Recommendations 
8.1 Findings 
F-1. The MDI workmanship problems were severe, and the rework was extensive. 
F-2. The types of MDI workmanship problems, if not 100 percent repaired, could result in an 
intermittent electrical connection within the power supply. 
F-3. The shutdowns are most likely caused by the MDI power supply, rather than by external 
factors.
F-4. The failure signature (low current draw with TVCIC shutdown and reset upon power 
cycle) may be indicative of a real or false overvoltage shutdown (output overvoltage or 
overvoltage circuit fault) on any of the “A1” outputs. 
F-5. The Century power supply is a robust design that is free from the issues that had been 
seen in the MDI units.  Thorough attention to packaging and process control was evident 
in the detailed drawing package provided for review and should provide assurance 
against reoccurrence of workmanship issues similar to those experienced with the MDI 
supplies.
F-6. The EMI Enclosures employed in Century Power Supplies are tin plated. This may pose a 
tin whisker growth concern. 
F-7. The MDI “A2” and “A3” output tie through resistors to accommodate the camera turn-on 
transient affects the load distribution.  The NESC team has determined that there may 
potentially be a premature failure of the power supply that is unrelated to the current 
power supply shut downs.  The concern is that the combined PTU and Camera inrush 
current requirements (presently unknown) may exceed the capability of the power supply 
(A3), thus overloading it and possibly causing premature failure.    
8.2 Observations 
O-1. Details of the bond wire fix in the MDI hybrid were not available for review.  MDI power 
supplies are still utilized onboard the ISS, and some repair techniques are known to be 
less reliable than others. 
O-2. The shut down of the “A3” output could impact the stability of the “A2” output due to the 
cross-tie and thus cause the shut down of the “A2” output. Malfunction of the “A2” low 
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line inhibit circuit may also cause shutdown, but would not latch and be reset by power 
cycle.
8.3 Recommendations 
R-1. Concur with JSC engineering’s recommendation to replace MDI Type IV power supplies 
with Century units pending satisfactory resolution of R-2, R-3, and R-4. (F-1, F-2, F-3, 
F-4, F-5, F-6) 
R-2. Test the Century power supply to verify that it can successfully provide the camera inrush 
current requirements of at least 3.1 amps for 4 milliseconds while maintaining the bus 
voltage specification requirement of 24 to 32 volts. (F-7) 
R-3. Show by performing an analysis that the Century power supply as built now can 
successfully deliver the camera inrush current requirements of at least 3.1 amps for 4 
milliseconds while maintaining the bus voltage specification requirement of 24 to 32 
volts. (F-7) 
R-4. Determine the potential effects of tin whisker growth on the tin plating of the EMI 
enclosure in the Century power supply. (F-6) 
R-5. Perform a failure analysis on the returned TVCIC and ETVCG to determine the root 
cause of the shutdown failures. (F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, F-5) 
R-6.  Electrically characterize the PTU input to determine if it reflects back large voltage 
spikes that would reduce the life of the power supply and to determine its inrush current 
profile. (F-7) 
R-7. As a part of the failure analysis, determine if the MDI power supply output cross-tie to 
accommodate the camera inrush current causes out-of-specification loading of the 
outputs. (F-7) 
R-8. Determine if A1, A2, and A3 power supply output overvoltage trip level settings are 
sufficient to preclude overstressing the ETVCG components.  (F-4)
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9.0 Alternate Viewpoints 
No information presented in this report was disputed by any of the NESC team.  
10.0 Other Deliverables 
There are no other deliverables identified for this investigation. 
11.0 Lessons Learned 
Drawing conversion for this activity was cumbersome since the contractor used a format 
(Imagination) that is not widely used.  Earlier access to drawing conversion software would have 
been beneficial. 
12.0 Definition of Terms  
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection 
by the investigating authority.
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap 
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed 
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; 
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision 
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.  
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the 
assessment/inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if left 
uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the 
severity should a mishap occur.  
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection. 
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Recommendation An action identified by the assessment/inspection team to correct a root 
cause or deficiency identified during the investigation.  The 
recommendations may be used by the responsible C/P/P/O in the 
preparation of a corrective action plan.
Root Cause Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal 
action or failure to act that could have been controlled systemically either 
by policy/practice/procedure or individual adherence to 
policy/practice/procedure.
13.0 Acronyms List 
Acronym Definition 
AWG American Wire Gauge 
BIT Built in Test 
C&TS Communications and Tracking System 
CCA Circuit Card Assembly 
CEI Contract End Item 
CI Critical Item 
CS Communication Systems 
CTVC Color Television Cameras 
DDCU DC-to-DC converter unit 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
EPC Electronic Power Converter 
EPS Electrical Power System 
ETVCG External TV Camera Group 
FET Field Effect Transmitter 
FO Fiber Optic 
FPMU Floating Potential Measurement Unit 
ga Gauge 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
Hz Hertz 
ICD Interface Control Document 
ICG Inertial Center of Gravity 
ISS International Space Station 
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
LLI Limited Life Item 
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LOOB Lower Outboard 
MDA McDonnell Douglas Aerospace 
MDI Modular Devices, Inc. 
MII Mechanical Installation Interface 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure 
MTBM Mean Time Between Maintenance 
NA Not Applicable 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDE NESC Discipline Expert 
NDI Nodular Devices, Incorporated 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NTSC National Television System Committee 
ORU Orbital Replaceable Unit 
OVP Overvoltage Protection 
PFM Pulse Frequency Modulation 
PRACA Problem Reporting and Correction Action 
PTU Pan Tilt Unit 
PWB Printed Wiring Board 
PWB Pulse Width Modulator 
RPC Remote Power Converter 
RPCM Remote Power Control(ler) Module 
SAW Solar Wing Array 
SCD Source Control Drawing 
SSD Space Station Division 
TBD To Be Determined/To Be Defined 
TIM Technical Interchange Meeting 
TV Television 
TVCIC TV Camera Interface Converter 
UDS Utility Distribution System 
ȝF microfarad 
ULF Utilization Logistics flight 
V Volt 
VDC Volts Direct Current 
VDS Video Subsystem 
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Appendix A.  NESC Request Form (PR-003-FM-01) 
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Appendix B.  Rough Calculations of Start-Up Circuit "Reasonable"  
Worst-Case 
Figure 1.  Simplified Schematic of Start-Up Circuit 
Zener Diode Voltages:
Zener Diode Voltages (variables Vz(T), Vz(Iz), Initial tolerance, radiation effects*) 
Minimum voltages considering 5% Initial Tolerance on ZENERs only
* Factors that would reduce Vbase voltage further:
Vz is a function of Iz (Lower Iz --> lower Vz)
Iz is dependant on base current into Q1 - Depends on Beta of Q1 (temperature and Ic dependant) 
V_D2min 6.2V 0.95 
V_D3min 5.1V 0.95 
V_D2min 5.89 V 
V_D3min 4.845 V 
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Vz is dependant on temperature of Zeners (Temperature compensated so dependence not that 
strong)
Radiation effects on zener voltage directly and Radiation degradation of the Beta of Q1 
Conservatively using only initial tolerance contribution:  
Vbasemin 10.735V 
Roughly speaking the draw on the HK supply is approximately 20mA; with Q1 Betamin = 40 the 
circuit will require 0.5mA. This will leave the Zeners with less than 250uA at nominal input 
voltage (at low line the current would decrease further). 
At low line with R1 running at high end of 5% tolerance (assumed): 
This current is below the datasheet current Izt where the zener voltages are specified (250uA). 
Diode CR3 Forward Voltage:
There is little data available for the 1N3070 Diode, so use what data is available and use data on 
similar parts to extrapolate for more precise voltage drop. 
This part is classified as a switching diode. Not sure why this choice was made for the MDI 
hybrid (possibly cost or availability). The switching diode data is not easy to come by since it is 
usually only used for non-critical switching or diode or-ing of signals. 
The forward drop for the 1N3070 in two different datasheets: 1.0V @100mA (25 degC) 
Table 1.  Microsemi Data for 1N3070 
Extrapolating for lower forward current from similar diode data: 
Vbasemin V_D2min V_D3min 
Vlowline 111V Izener
Vlowline
1.05 150 K:
§¨
©
·¸
¹
0.5 10 3 A 
Izener 2.048 10 4u A 
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Vf drops by approximately 0.1V when current changes from 100mA to 10mA 
Obviously at cold temperatures the forward voltage goes up. For rough worst case number can 
use Vfd1max = 0.9V @25 degC (slightly higher at cold temps)
Vbe Calculation for Q1:
Have data for Vbe under saturated conditions for 2N3440, need better data for our case.
Table 2.  Boca Semiconductor Data for 2N3439 
This Vbe is for overdriven BJT, at a higher base current than our case at 25 ºC. Looking at 
curves for Vbe in active region vs. saturation and lower current levels, we can assume that the 
Vbemax on Q1 is probably no more than 1.0V maximum. 
Vfd1max 0.9V 
Vbeq1max 1.0V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MOSFET Drive Current:
IRFC340 drive current: Maximum gate charge of 65nC per cycle (if this was shared equally from 
two 0.33uF caps would correspond to approximately 0.1V droop on HK supply. 
Assume 1845 switching frequency: 
Bonding Wire Drops on Hybrid: 
Bonding Wire Resistance: The chart below gives rough order of magnitude. 
Figure 2.  Electrical Resistance vs. Wire Diameter 
fswitching 200 103Hz 
Idrivemax fswitching 65 10 9 coul 
Idrivemax 0.013 A 
Ibiasmaxstart Idrivemax 0.017 A 
Ibiasmaxstart 0.03 A 
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MDI schematic has two connections each for the Vc and GND connections to the 1845 Die. This 
was likely to reduce the effects of bonding wire resistance for this current path (17mA to bias 
1845 plus the current to drive the IRFC340 FET on/off; approximately 10+ mA, see above 
calculation). 
The bonding wire resistance and any voltage drops on the bond itself could be very important in 
ensuring adequate margin over the full operational range. Two such bond wires are highlighted 
in the below schematic, other points in the circuit (that are not shown) are at least as important in 
calculating a solid worst case analysis.  
Conservatively only consider the two bonding wire connections that go to the supply and ground 
connections of the 1845 PWM die:  
Assume that since MDI doubled up the supply lines to and from the 1845 that the total resistance 
was no more than 0.7Ohms for supply and 0.7Ohms for Ground connections. 
The voltage drop due to the bonding wires to the 1845 is not that large (based on loose 
assumptions).  It is pretty clear that there are opportunities for other voltage drops within the 
hybrid circuit that could (in sum total) create a significant impact. 
Final Summary of Start-Up Voltage to 1845:
Calculated "Reasonable" Worst Case startup voltage: 
Nominal_WC_StartUP 8.793 V 
Rbond1 0.7ohm 
Rbond2 0.7ohm 
Vbond1 Rbond1 Ibiasmaxstar 
Vbond1 0.021 V 
Vbond2 Rbond2 Ibiasmaxstar 
Vbond2 0.021 V 
Nominal_WC_StartUP Vbasemin Vbond1 Vbond2 Vfd1max Vbeq1max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Datasheet values: Specified Maximum startup voltage for 1845:  9.0V
Specified Nominal Startup voltage for 1845:    8.4V 
A few of the factors ignored in the final number:
Temperature Effects 
Radiation Effects 
Zener Voltage not adjusted for lower bias current levels (low line especially) 
In Defense of this Circuit:
It is not clear what the startup current from this supply would actually be. The datasheet for the 
1845 talks about the startup current in the highlights but does not describe when the controller 
would begin switching, or if the "start-up" voltage gets "latched" and will not cutout until the 
voltage drops below the minimum. 
PWM ICs are a mixture of analog circuits and "digital" control. There has been a wide variation 
from vendor to vendor, and across parts. If it is not specified explicitly in the datasheet, it is 
difficult to accept at face value. 
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Appendix C.   MDI Workmanship Summary (Larry Pack) 
NESC, ISS External Camera Shutdown Assessment. 
Based on the documentation I have reviewed, the discussions with those involved in analyzing 
the shutdown signature, descriptions of the rework, and historical knowledge of packaging 
design and manufacturing practices for space flight hardware, I agree with Susan Creasy’s 
concerns expressed in NESC Technical Assessment Plan, #PL-06-04. My conclusion is that there 
is significant risk associated with the use of the MDI power supplies in the ISS External Camera 
systems. I believe the probability is very high that TVCIC failures, similar to the ones 
experienced on the ETVCG’s, will occur in the other TVCIC’s. It is my recommendation that the 
MDI TVCIC’s be replaced with proven reliable power systems from qualified vendors. 
However, all aspects of the replacement units including the electrical design, packaging design, 
manufacturing process, workmanship, and testing results must be confirmed to meet 
requirements prior to acceptance for replacement. My assessments are based on the following 
information. 
Summary of My MDI PS Assessment: 
MDI Power Supply delivery;
1. MDI Power Supply deliveries completed 12/1994 (14 Flight Units). 
MDI Power Supply failures discovered approximately 8/97;
      1.   L3 Communication Systems and Modular Devices Inc. started reworking failed units late 
1997-early 1998. 
Signature of failures (per NESC/TAC #PL-06-04);
1. TVCIC from S1 ETVCG shuts down 2 times per hour 
2. TVCIC from P1 ETVCG (installed 11/05) shut down 9 times in 1 month. 
Suspected cause/reason for failures (as expressed in NESC/TAC #PL-06-04); 
      1. Packaging design and workmanship in the MDI power supply assembly is suspected of 
contributing to the cause/reason for the failures*. 
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*  While there may be other suspected causes/reasons for the MDI Power supply failures under 
investigation, such as parts degradation due to radiation exposure or the electrical design, this 
assessment addresses only packaging and workmanship related failures.    
Brief summary description of documented workmanship problems suspected of contributing to 
the MDI Power Supply failures (per Will Heydon’s CR: AOE-0473, dated 11/8/99);
1.   Broken capacitor leads due to mechanical stress. 
2.   Failed FET bond wires within hybrid due to electrical overstress (fused open). 
3. Fractured solder joints on swaged terminals due to poor PWB design/layout. Swaged 
terminals installed in un-plated through holes, insufficient solder, and dissimilar 
materials. Swaged terminals were reworked with leash wires. Leash wires are considered 
repairs rather than rework. Generally, a flight board is limited to 24 repairs per 100 
square inches. While it is desirable to use plated-through holes for terminals, they are 
routinely used in plated-through and non-plated-through holes, However, terminals 
should never be used as electrical interfaces without plated through holes (NHB 
5300.4(3A-2)(3A501.1.a), NASA-STD-8739.3(8.2.1.b).
4. Fractured solder joints on transformer pins due to poor PWB design/layout, installation in 
un-plated through holes, poor solder wetting, and dissimilar materials. The Quality 
Assurance recommended practice for terminating discrete wires is to use terminals rather 
than pads on the PWB surface or holes through the PWB, provided there is sufficient 
room for the terminals. This method of terminating ensures inspectable solder joints and 
strain relieved wires. Discrete wires may be soldered directly to the PWB provided the 
wires are properly routed and fanned, with sufficient strain relief. 
5. Missing failure reports, undocumented rework, missing and incomplete travelers, missing 
test data, missing in-process inspections. 
6. Wiring errors discovered in Type IV supplies. 
7. Blown rack fuse occurred during thermal testing (+/- 5V). 
8. Blown rack fuse occurred during OVP testing. 
9. 2 swaged terminal life tests failed 10/29/98.  
10. Rework of transformer caused cracks in 2oz and 4oz copper traces. Leash repair of all 
pins and terminals completed.  
11. Extensive rework performed to correct these problems (at least 2,530 repairs, added 
wires, reworks, and touch-ups). Generally, a flight board is limited to 24 repairs per 100 
square inches. 
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Appendix D.  MDI Repair/Rework Discussion 
From: Cooke, Robert W. (JSC-NA)[WGI] [mailto:robert.w.cooke@nasa.gov]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2006 10:14 AM 
To: Kichak, Robert A. (GSFC-560.0)[NASHQ]; Young, Eric M. (GSFC-563.0); Pack, Larry E. (GSFC-562.0); 
eric.a.obleman@boeing.com; Berezin, Boris J; cpandipa@pop400.gsfc.nasa.gov; DANA HELVY 
Subject: FW: ISS Camera Power Supply Questions
Fyi…
A point of clarification is recommended.  The “leashes” installed in the MDI units are technically 
considered modifications, rather than repairs.
The accepted practice is to limit the total number of modifications to a printed circuit assembly to three (3) 
per 25 cm2 (3.875 in2) area, per side. This equates to a maximum of 12 per 100cm2.
For the leash modifications performed on the MDI units, a MUA was issued to allow the greater number.
Bob
_____________________________________________
From: Cooke, Robert W. (JSC-NX)[WGI] 
Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 9:50 AM 
To: Kichak, Robert A. (GSFC-560.0)[NASHQ] 
Subject: ISS Camera Power Supply Questions
Bob,
Some things to consider:
The L-3 documents indicate that approximately 100-120 solder terminations involving swaged turret 
terminals used as interfacial electrical interconnects in non-plated through holes (NPTH) were repaired 
per board.  The reported number of repairs per board greatly exceeds NASA and industry recognized 
allowances, and is a significant reliability concern even if each repair was completed successfully.  There 
is a significant risk of thermal and mechanical stress to the circuit board, and there is the possibility that 
the repair process may have missed some components.
Most board-level repair activity requires the technician to work to a red-lined drawing that identifies each 
component affected and the required repair action. The technician may also use this print or other 
document(s) to verify that each repair has been completed and inspected.  This process works, assuming 
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all the targeted components are clearly identified on the print and the technician accurately accounts for 
and documents each repair.  The concerns are:
1.     The reported number of repairs per board and the use of manual repair processes presents a 
significant risk that one or more identified repairs may have been overlooked or incorrectly identified as 
having been repaired.  
2.     The reported number of repairs per board and the component density of the board increases the 
possibility that one or more of the terminals requiring repair may not been identified on the print. Repair 
activities are limited to only those areas identified in the documentation. 
3.     The component density of the board, combined by the number of repairs and schedule pressure 
would also increase the possibility that the technician may not have been able to identify components that 
were not identified by the design engineer and the redlined print as requiring repair. If the print did not 
identify a component as requiring repair, and the technician was unable to identify that component as 
having been missed on the print but requiring repair, then the possibility exists that the same component 
was not repaired on ALL the assemblies. This would then represent a reliability concern common to all 
the circuit boards processed for repair.
4.     The risk of thermal and mechanical damage to the printed wiring board and surrounding 
components can be reduced, and reliability of the repair can be increased, by the use of preheat during 
repair activities.  There has been no confirmation that preheat was used during the repair process.
Questions:
1.     What process was used to originally solder assemble the boards?
2.     Were the terminals originally soldered with high-temperature solder?
3.     Was preheat used during manual assembly and/or repair activities?
The failure timeline and signature is also characteristic of the failure mode typically seen in surface mount 
technology (SMT) ceramic chip capacitors that were manually soldered.  We need to verify the soldering 
processes used for any SMT components.
Bob
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Appendix E.  PRACA Reports 
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The objective of this technical assessment was to investigate the on-orbit shutdown problem with the ISS External TV Camera
Group (ETVCG) that the ISS Video Subsystem Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) concluded to be most likely caused by a
Television Camera Interface Converter (TVCIC) Modular Devices Inc. (MDI) power supply workmanship problem.The Truss
Segment Starboard -1 (S1) ETVCG was installed on 9A (STS-112), and the TVCIC failure signature of shut downs up to two times
per hour behavior started two years after installation. The second failure was with the Truss Segment Port-1 (P1) ETVCG which
was launched on 11A (STS-113), but was just installed in November 2005. Its anomalous failure started within one hour of initial
start-up. It had nine shut downs in December 2005. During each shut down the ground operators observed loss of video which was
restored by cycling the power to the affected TVCIC.
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